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occupation is purely a matter of private interest, subject to only a
limited degree of legislative restriction.7 It is submitted that the
present case was rightly decided since the individual has something in
the nature of a vested right to drive his private car.
One court, in considering whether or not a certain ordinance im-
posed an arbitrary power in an officer, considered, among other
factors, the hardship a refusal of the permit would impose on the
applicant.8
The tendency of the courts to become more liberal in the con-
struction of this type of statute can, to some extent, be attributed to
the growing complexity of our administrative government, necessitat-
ing a grant of greater discretionary powers to local authorities.9
WEX S. MALONE.
Constitutional Law-Taxation-Chain Store Tax
The recent case of The Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company
et al. v. Maxwell' held valid under both state and federal Constitu-
tions a statute2 declaring every person, firm or corporation operating
or maintaining two or more stores or mercantile establishments under
the same general management, supervision, or ownership to be a
chain store operator per se, and as such subject to a license tax, for
the privilege of engaging in such business, of fifty dollars ($50.00)
on each and every store operated in the state in excess of one. The
a vested right) ; Brunswick-Balke Co. v. Mecklenburg Co., 181 N. C. 386, 107
S. E. 317 (1921) (Operation of billiard parlor held privilege).
"In the following cases ordinances laying down apparently arbitrary pow-
ers of discrimination were held valid: Sumner v. Ward, 126 Wash. 75, 217
Pac. 502 (1923) (peddlers) ; Minces v. Schoenig, 72 Minn. 528, 75 N. W. 711
(1898) (gift, fire, and bankrupt sales) ; State v. Cohen, 73 N. H. 543, 63 Atl.
928 (1906) (dealers in junk); Gundling v. Chicago, 177 U. S. 183 (1900)
(sale of cigarettes) ; Clark v. McBride, 101 N. J. L. 213, 127 Atl. 550 (1925)
(employment agencies).8 Matthews v. Murphy, 23 Ky. L. Rep. 750, 63 S. W. 785, 786 (1901).
'Leach v. Daugherty, 73 Cal. App. 83, 238 Pac. 160 (1925); Ex parte
Kreutzer, supra note 4.
The Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company et al v. Maxwell, Commis-
sioner of Revenue of North Carolina, 199 N. C. 433 (1930).
""Branch or Chain Stores. Every person, firm or corporation engaged in
the business of operating or maintaining in this State, under the same general
management, supervision, or ownership, two or more stores or mercantile
establishments, where goods, wares, and/or merchandise is sold or offered for
sale at retail shall be deemed a branch or chain store operator, shall apply for
and obtain from the Commissioner of Revenue a State license for the privilege
of engaging in such business of a branch or chain store operator, and shall
pay for such license fifty dollars ($50.00) on each and every store operated in
this State in excess of one." N. C. Pun. LAws (1929), c. 345, §162.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
statute obviously was passed to remedy the defects of the 1927 chain
store tax3 which was declared void in The Great Atlantic and Pacific
Tea Company v. Doughtonw The present statute differs from the
former one in that it is not retroactive, 5 and the classification is be-
tween operators of one store and operators of more than one store.
The right of the state to tax trades for the purpose of raising
revenue and to classify for the purpose of taxation is no longer
questioned. The only requirements under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment are that such classifications be reasonable and not arbitrary,
for the Amendment was not intended to compel the State to adopt
an iron rule of equal taxation. 6
Due to the campaign being waged in the press and over the radio
against chain stores, it is inevitable that various types of legislation
directed at chain stores will be passed.7 To date, with the exception
of North Carolina, only two such statutes have been before the courts.
The Supreme Court of Kentucky declared an Act requiring a "cash
and carry" grocery store to pay a higher tax than a regular service
grocery store to be unconstitutional on the basis that there was no
reasonable grounds for the distinction.8 The Federal District Court
recently held an Indiana Act taxing mercantile store operators by a
'"Branch or Chain Stores. That any person, firm, corporation, or asso-
ciation operating or maintaining within this State, under the same general
management, supervision or ownership, six or more stores or mercantile estab-
lishments, shall pay a license tax of $50.00 for each such store, or mercantile
establishment in the State, for the privilege of operating or maintaining such
store or mercantile establishments." N. C. PuB. LAws (1927), c. 80, §162.
"The Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company et al. v. Doughton, Commis-
sioner of Revenue of North Carolina, 196 N. C. 145, 144 S. E. 701 (1928).
An excellent article dealing with this case and the chain store tax in general is
-Becker and Hess, The Chain Store License Tax and the Fourteenth Amend-
wnent (1929), 7 N. C. L. Rav. 115. Also commented on in (1929) 3 TEmPLE
L. Q. 322, and (1929) 7 TENN. L. Rav. 316.
Clarkson, J., concurring in Tea Co. v. Doughton, supra note 4: "The vice
of the license tax to my mind is in the fact that when the sixth store is taxed
it is retroactive, and not only is the sixth store taxed but the first five also."
'This question is fully discussed by Becker and Hess, op. cit. supra note 4.
Cases dealing with discrimination in license tax based on different methods used
in same kind of business annotated in Note (1926) 43 A. L. R. 592.
' In a recent address before the Kansas Retail Grocers Association, Gov-
ernor Theodore Christianson of Minnesota said that where ten years ago only
four per cent of the country's retail business was done by chain stores, today
more than twenty per cent of the total retail business was done by them. He
also said that there are now in America over 100,000 chain stores having annual
sales of more than $8,000,000,000. U. S. DAILY, Oct. 24, 1930 at 2587. Such a
radical change in the economic life of the nation will necessarily call for some
kind of regulatory legislation.
'City of Danville v. Quaker Maid, Inc., 211 Ky. 677, 278 S. W. 98, 43
A. L. R. 590 (1925).
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graduated scale based on the number of stores owned to be unconsti-
tutional.9 The judge in so holding said, "All persons engaged in the
operation of one or more stores or mercantile establishments within
the state of Indiana belong to the same class for occupational tax
purposes, as the plaintiff."
The North Carolina decision is opposed to the above holdings, but
it is submitted that the result is correct. The court recognizes as a
proper basis for classification the protection of the independent
merchant class.
MooRE BRYSON.
Criminal Law-Automobiles--Manslaughter-Failure to
Stop at Highway Intersection.
Defendant, in violation of a statute,' failed to stop before turning
into a highway from a side road. Just as his car straightened out in
the highway it was struck from the rear by a bus. The bus skidded,
turned over, and a passenger was killed. Defendant was charged
with manslaughter. The pavement was slippery with snow and ice,
and the defendant's car was first seen by the bus driver when it was
five or ten feet away. A person coming into the highway from the
side road could see to the left-the direction from which the bus
came-for a distance of 175 yards. Held, the purpose of the statute
is to allow motorists to gain a knowledge of conditions on the high-
way. Since the defendant already had such knowledge, the purpose
of the statute had been accomplished, and there was no proximate
'Jackson v. State Board of Tax Commissioners of Indiana et al., 38 F. (2d)
652 (S. D. Ind. 1930). AcTs IND. 1929, c. 207, §5, (The validity of the
classification in such section being the main question of the case.) is as fol-
lows: "Every person, firm, corporation, association, or copartnership opening,
establishing, operating or maintaining one or more stores or mercantile estab-
lishments, within this state, under the same general management, supervision,
or ownership, shall pay the license fees hereinafter prescribed for the privilege
of opening, etc....
The license fees hereinafter prescribed shall be as follows:(1) Upon one store the annual license fee shall be three dollars for each
such store;(2) Upon two stores or more, but not to exceed five stores, the annual
license fee shall be ten dollars for each such additional store;(3) Upon each store in excess of five, but not to exceed ten, the annual
license fee shall be fifteen dollars for each such additional store;(4) Upon each store in excess of ten, but not to exceed twenty, the annual
license fee shall be twenty dollars for each such additional store;(5) Upon each store in excess of twenty, the annual license see shall be
twenty-five dollars for each such additional store."
'N. C. ANN. CoDE (Michie, 1927), §2621 (63).
